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Abstract
This paper begins an analysis of the real line using an inconsistency-
tolerant (paraconsistent) logic. We show that basic field and compactness
properties hold, by way of novel proofs that make no use of consistency-
reliant inferences; some techniques from constructive analysis are used
instead. While no inconsistencies are found in the algebraic operations on
the real number field, prospects for other non-trivializing contradictions
are left open.
This paper has two aims. The first is to show that, by weakening the logic
within which we work, so as to allow for the possibility of non-trivial inconsis-
tency, we are still able to do everyday mathematics. We see why such practice
is possible: We take classical proofs, note the obstacles from a paraconsistent
viewpoint, and then reconstruct the arguments, using only inferences that are
valid in nontrivial inconsistent contexts. This ‘breakdown’ of analysis enables
a fuller understanding of the fine structure of proofs. The strategy is to reverse
engineer classical results (cf. [19, sec.16.1]), eventually deriving a paraconsistent
basis for analysis, and this paper is a step in that direction. A fundamental re-
sult is the Heine-Borel theorem, characterising compactness of bounded closed
intervals.
The second aim of the paper is to explain, in part, a basic historical fact:
the original calculus of Newton and Leibniz was inconsistent—in the sense that
the original definition of derivative involves a number ε which is at some points
non-zero (to permit division), and at other points zero (to allow ‘infinitessi-
mal’ quantities to vanish); see [6], [18].1 Yet, despite the inconsistency, early
practitioners were able to draw meaningful and useful conclusions. Despite con-
tradictions, they got the right answers. Accounting for how this is possible
provides one motivation for working in a paraconsistent logic—reconstructing
structures in which inconsistent reasoning actually did take place, and yet did
so without falling into incoherence.
∗University of Canterbury; maarten.jordens@canterbury.ac.nz
†University of Melbourne; zweber@unimelb.edu.au
1The work in this paper differs strongly from [6], in which all the reasoning takes place in
consistent contexts. There are also versions of non-trivial inconsistent calculus that separates
the reals [15], [16], [9] (in [1]), again involving a different approach. By contrast, this paper is
not a model-theoretic development, and so does not include similar claims to non-triviality.
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Our interest here is in compactness properties. It turns out that, to un-
derstand the Heine-Borel theorem in a paraconsistent system, detours through
ideas from constructive analysis are needed; e.g. Brouwer’s fan theorem plays
a key role [5, §5.3]. This is something of a surprise, since paraconsistency has
often been taken as a dual or opposite to constructive, paracomplete theories
[16, ch. 11],[7].2 It has been quipped of constructive mathematicians that they
perform mathematics with one hand tied behind their back, working without
universal application of the law of excluded middle. Here we tie the other hand
behind our backs, and work without disjunctive syllogism or general forms of
reductio. Constructive mathematicians have developed powerful tools to over-
come truth value gaps; here, by restoring excluded middle, but considering the
possibility of truth-value gluts, those techniques become an extremely effective
way to push through proofs—a way to preserve important parts of real analysis
under the possibility of inconsistency.
1 Logic
First we describe a paraconsistent logic. We do not make much of the logic per
se, except to note its main features and to suggest that it is a good candidate
for embedding paraconsistent real analysis. See the Appendix §6 for details.
Crucially, for our logic to be inconsistency-tolerant but nontrivial, it is neces-
sary to characterize a consequence relation ` such that A,¬A 6` B, for arbitrary
A,B—that is, the logic must be nonexplosive. (The logic will be weaker than
classical logic, not validating ex contradictione quodlibet.) We also want a logic
strong enough to validate inferences like modus ponens and even reductio (if
A ` ¬A, then ¬A). The logic, given in the Appendix, follows the Australasian
school of paraconsistent, relevant logic [23], [13], [20], and fits these needs well;
it has been shown to form a solid basis for paraconsistent set theory [4], [24].
In the next sections, we only point out a few important features.
1.1 Invalid Inferences
An inference is invalid if it does not preserve truth, and in the context of in-
consistency one must take extra care. By the definition of paraconsistency, the
explosion rule A,¬A ` B is not allowed. But then neither is anything that
validates explosion. To this end, disjunctive syllogism,
A,¬A ∨B ` B,
2Goodman [11] saw the duality but rejected it. Still earlier, da Costa [10] had intuitions
of duality between the logic C1 and intuitionism (although there turned out not to be).
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is invalid in this context, due to C.I. Lewis’ famous argument in [12, p. 250].
In classical logic, ¬A∨B is read as A implies B. Since disjunctive syllogism
fails, though, we cannot read ¬A∨B this way; otherwise we would be saying that
modus ponens fails, too. Since modus ponens is inviolably true, we introduce a
new implication connective, →. A crucial point to note about this connective is
that the deduction theorem is not in general true. That is, we do not have the
property:
If A ` B, then ` A→ B.
So a deduction, marked by `, is very different from an implication, marked by
→. In particular, → obeys contraposition, while ` does not. More about this
in the next section.
1.2 Restricted Quantifiers
In the following we make use of restricted quantifiers; cf. Brady [3, p. 327];
Butchart [8]. Restricted quantification, the formalization of the statement ‘all
As are Bs’, looks like this:
∀x ∈ A(x ∈ B)
where we write x ∈ A interchangeably with A(x), thereby supposing in the
background some set A = {z : A(z)}.
The key behavior of these quantifiers is to validate the following:
If x ∈ A ` x ∈ B, then ` ∀x ∈ A(x ∈ B).
Concretely, in what follows we are concerned with the set R, and want to prove
theorems of the form ‘all real numbers are B.’ By the above rule, when we can
prove x ∈ B from the assumption that x ∈ R, where use of other background
assumptions is also allowed, then we can write the formula: ∀x ∈ R(x ∈ B).
Restricted quantifiers are intended to be stronger than classical material
implication, because they obey modus ponens,
∀x ∈ A(x ∈ B), a ∈ A ` a ∈ B
but weaker than our arrow-implication (so they are not simply shorter ways of
saying ∀x(Ax→ Bx)), because they obey de Morgan exchanges,
∀x ∈ A(x ∈ B) a` ¬∃x ∈ A(x 6∈ B)
∃x ∈ A(x ∈ B) a` ¬∀x ∈ A(x 6∈ B)
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as well as ‘weakening’:
∀x(x ∈ A),` ∀x ∈ B(x ∈ A).
The point is to have sentences of our language that are about what we can
prove. In particular, there are often cases where we want to say that, since
everything is A, then all Bs are A; but this statement is significantly weaker
than anything expressed by →.3
Finally, in introducing these quantifiers it is essential to look out for contrac-
tion, or else face Curry’s paradox [14], [2]; see the final note of our §Appendix.
While these quantifiers are not yet widespread in the literature, we think
the pages ahead makes a good test case for their being natural and useful.
1.3 A note on absurdity
We include the ‘zero-place connective’ ⊥. This symbol is characterised by the
property:
⊥ ` A,
for all A. Throughout, when ⊥ is derivable, it will mean that the system
trivializes the real numbers. For the present purpose, it will suffice to define ⊥
as the sentence 0 = 1. This makes sense from the standpoint of von Neumann
ordinals and set theoretic identity.4 Letting 0 = ∅ = {x : ∀yx ∈ y} and 1 = {0},
then if 0 = 1, ∀x(x ∈ 1 → x ∈ 0). Since 0 ∈ 1, we would have 0 ∈ 0, and then
x ∈ y, for any y; so x ∈ {z : A}, where A is any sentence at all. This justifies
the definition and ‘absurdity’ property of ⊥.
While the disjunctive syllogism is not valid in full generality, it is valid in
the following sense: If A ∨ B, and ⊥ follows from A, then B follows. This
characterises the idea that while the system ought to tolerate inconsistencies, it
should not degenerate into triviality. Employing a restricted form of disjunctive
syllogism using ⊥ is no assurance of consistency; but it does appear to be
unavoidable, and is a very useful way to reason. One simple application is
shown in the next section.
3Since the logic is ‘relevant’ it does not include weakening, A ` B → A. With weakening,
we would have to drop contraposition. Else, we could argue from A to ¬B → A, then to
¬A → B. But if also ¬A holds, i.e. A is a true contradiction, then B follows by modus
ponens, where B is arbitrary. The improper inference here is just A ` ¬A → B, a form of
explosion. Conversely, to ensure that these quantifiers do not simply amount to smuggling
material implication back in requires that ∀x(¬A ∨B) does not entail ∀x ∈ A(x ∈ B).
4Though see the first paragraph of §2 below. Note too that 0 = 1 can actually hold in
some models of paraconsistent arithmetic, without leading to explosion [16, p. 18]. So taking
0 = 1 as absurdity may not be invariant across all possible paraconsistent mathematical
arrangements, especially in contexts where the symbols ‘0’ and ‘1’ are not defined.
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1.4 Subsets and Complementation
Restricted quantifiers and an absurdity operator now allow us to fix some nota-
tion.
Definition 1. X ⊆ Y := ∀z ∈ X(z ∈ Y ) means that X is a subset of Y , while
X ⊂ Y := X ⊆ Y ∧X 6= Y means that X is a proper subset of Y . Any x is in
the complement of Y in X, written X \ Y , iff both x ∈ X and x ∈ Y ` ⊥.
To put matters concretely, we will want to discuss
x ∈ R \ {0}
which is all the x ∈ R excluding 0. The phrasing of the definition of complement5
rules out 0 ∈ R\{0}, (which otherwise would still be paraconsistently compatible
with 0 6∈ R \ {0}). See §2.1 below.
We similarly state the immediate consequence of definition 1 in concrete
terms, although obviously R could be anything.
Proposition 1. If R = A ∪B, then R \A ⊆ B.
Proof. If x ∈ R \ A, then x ∈ R but if x ∈ A then ⊥. Yet if x ∈ R, then by
hypothesis x ∈ A or x ∈ B. Arguing by cases, x ∈ B.
Properties like this are useful to bear in mind during left-half/right-half type
arguments about intervals such as in §4.
2 The Real Numbers
A paraconsistent logic allows fine distinctions where classical logic sees only
equivalences.6 Where any one of many arrangements and phrasings will yield
the same classical theory, here the precise way definitions and axioms are stated
is decisive for the success or failure of proving theorems. For instance, strict
inequality x < y is often glossed as ∃z(z > 0 ∧ x + z = y). As a definition,
this would make the proof of theorem 2 much more difficult, or even impossible,
because the existential quantifier gets in the way. On the other hand, this gloss
on < follows as theorem 13. So each choice is much more delicate than a classical
analyst might realize. This is a theme that will repeat as we go along.
5The definition of complement is a meta-clause, since it is making a conditional statement
about the deducibility relation ` of the language. The definiens is not itself a statement of
the language; cf. the structural rules at §6. This differs from a usual notion of complement
X \ Y := {x : x ∈ X ∧ x 6∈ Y }. This latter is meaningful, but is not enough to deliver facts
like proposition 1 or its uses below, because of the invalidity of disjunctive syllogism.
6The simplest example: A∧¬A is distinct from ⊥. More subtly, x = y ∧ y = z → x = z is
distinct from x = y → (y = z → x = z). C.f. ¬¬A versus A in constructive settings.
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We assert field and order properties of a set called R, the real numbers.7
The positive real numbers, strictly greater than 0, are called R+ (see §3). The
reals contain a subset N that is also assumed to have some standard features.
The following axioms are taken as primitive, in the manner of e.g. Meyer’s
relevant arithmetic R#, as opposed to proving that some construction based on
the integers satisfies them.8
Axiom 1. The reals are a field under addition and multiplication.
Axiom 2. The reals are linearly ordered.
Axiom 3. Every nonempty set of reals bounded above has a least upper bound.
The rest of this section is devoted to spelling out in detail what it is that
these axioms mean, and some implications for using them in a paraconsistent
system.
2.1 Axiom 1: The reals are a field
Denote addition by the symbol + and multiplication by ·. Then for any x, y, z ∈
R, this axiom asserts the following properties:
(i) Closure: x+ y ∈ R, and x · y ∈ R;
(ii) Commutativity: x+ y = y + x, and x · y = y · x;
(iii) Associativity: x+ (y + z) = (x+ y) + z, and x · (y · z) = (x · y) · z;
(iv) Existence of identity elements 0 and 1 in R: x+ 0 = x, and x · 1 = x;
(v) Existence of inverse elements:
the additive inverse −x ∈ R, such that x+ (−x) = 0,
and the multiplicative inverse x−1 ∈ R, such that (x · x−1 = 1) , which
exists on the condition that x ∈ R \ {0};
(vi) Distributivity: x · (y + z) = x · y + x · z.
There are some points to note here.
Firstly, in (iv), identity elements 0 and 1 are distinct, as we take 0 = 1 to
imply ⊥ and thereby triviality.
7Note that this axiomatic approach is different from, but complementary to, the model
theoretic approach favored by Meyer, Mortensen, et al. The latter is better for showing
non-triviality; axiomatics are better, we think, for proving textbook-style theorems.
8In either [4] or [24], a development of paraconsistent set theory is provided, the latter
including proofs for Peano’s postulates. The set N exists, with many of its expected properties;
the powerset of N exists, too. Facts about functions, mathematical induction and definitions
by recursion are all covered. Such reassurance is good to have in the background; e.g. the
proof of Ko¨nig’s lemma (Lemma 19) below calls for defining a function by recursion. All the
same, the arrangement here may simply be taken as axiomatic.
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Secondly, the condition in (v) for the existence of a multiplicative inverse to
x is that x is any real but 0, according to definition 1. This condition is vital:
it corresponds to the usual (classical) idea that we cannot divide by 0. But
the condition here must be stronger, since in a paraconsistent system it is not
enough to have x 6= 0; we must reject the idea that x could be zero; see §3.2,
theorem 12 and its consequences.
Lastly, we adopt the usual notational conventions about the symbols +, ·,
and x−1.
2.2 Axiom 2: The reals have a total partial order
The set R is endowed with a total partial order 6, satisfying, for each x, y, z in
R:
(i) Reflexivity: x 6 x;
(ii) Transitivity: x 6 y ∧ y 6 z → x 6 z;
(iii) Antisymmetry: x 6 y ∧ y 6 x↔ x = y;
(iv) Totality: x 6 y → y 6 x.
(Again, see §Appendix for details on the → connective.) The properties (i) and
(ii) are the requirements for 6 to be a preorder; (iii) ensures this is a partial
order; and (iv) makes this a total order. By the law of excluded middle, the
totality clause can be used to derive the more usual form
x 6 y ∨ y 6 x,
which we use liberally.
The ordering on R interacts with the field operations as follows. For all
x, y, z in R:
(v) x 6 y ` x+ z 6 y + z,
(vi) x 6 y, z > 0 ` xz 6 yz.
It is possible to do with fewer conditions here: observe that reflexivity is a
consequence of totality, and that antisymmetry need not be posed as a bicon-
ditional (and so we can safely leave these conditions off, noting that x = x is a
consequence of reflexivity and antisymmetry of 6, reassuring us that = is indeed
an equivalence relation). However, the aim here is to produce a solid, nontrivial
system from which to derive properties of real numbers, and not necessarily a
minimal system.
The following definition sets in place the necessary requirements for the usual
strict ordering on the reals.
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Definition 2. x < y := x 6 y ∧ x 6= y.
Theorem 2. Let x, y, z ∈ R. Then:
(i) x 6< x
(ii) x < y ` y 6< x
(iii) x < y, y < z ` x < z
(iv) x < y, y < x ` x 6= x
(v) x 6= y ` x < y ∨ y < x
(vi) x < y, y 6 z ` x < z
(vii) x 6 y ` x < y ∨ x = y
(viii) x < y ∨ x = y ∨ y < x
Proof. Since x = x for all real x, ¬(x 6 x ∧ x 6= x), whence x 6< x, proving (i).
For (ii), if x < y, then x 6 y. Either y 6 x or y 6 x. In the first case, since
also x 6 y, this implies x = y, and then y 6< x by definition; in the second case,
y 6< x by definition again.
For (iii), if x < y and y < z, then x 6 y, x 6= y, y 6 z and y 6= z. So
x 6 z by transitivity. Either x = z or not. If not, then x < z by definition. If
x = z, then substituting x for z in the premises, x = y by antisymmetry. Now
substituting x for y in y 6= z, again x < z by definition.
For (iv), if x < y and y < x, then x 6 y, y 6 x, and x 6= y by definition. By
antisymmetry, x = y. Substituting, x 6= x.
For (v), suppose x 6= y. By totality of 6, either x 6 y or y 6 x. In the
former case x < y, and in the latter case y < x, by definition.
For (vi), from x < y and y 6 z, we have x 6 z. If x 6= z then we stop;
if x = z then by substitution z < y, and then z = y; and then x < z by
substitution again.
For (vii), suppose x 6 y. Either x 6= y or x = y. In the former case, x < y
by definition.
Trichotomy (viii) follows from the axiom x 6 y → y 6 x: since x 6 y∨x 6 y,
x 6 y ∨ y 6 x. Distributing this over x = y ∨ x 6= y gives the result.
2.3 Axiom 3: The least-upper-bound principle
Definition 3. A real number y ∈ R is an upper bound for S ⊆ R iff
∀x ∈ S(x 6 y).
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A set of reals is bounded above if it has an upper bound. The least upper bound
of S, called supS (the supremum of S), is an upper bound of S such that it is
less than or equal to every upper bound of S:
∀z ∈ R (∀x ∈ S(x 6 z)→ supS 6 z) .
The terms lower bound, bounded below, and greatest lower bound (the infimum
of S, inf S) are defined similarly, in the obvious way; a set S ⊆ R is bounded
if it is both bounded above and bounded below.
The following proposition makes it clear that use of the definite article is
justified when referring to the least upper bound of a set of reals.
Proposition 3. The supremum of a set of reals S that is bounded above is
unique.
Proof. Let y be a least upper bound of S. Then for any x ∈ S, x 6 supS and
x 6 y. Being ‘least’ means that, for all z ∈ R,
∀x ∈ S(x 6 z)→ supS 6 z,
and also that
∀x ∈ S(x 6 z)→ y 6 z.
Since both supS and y are in R, supS 6 y, and y 6 supS. Thus y = supS by
antisymmetry, as required.
Proposition 4. Let S ⊆ R be non-empty and bounded above. For each y ∈ R,
if y is not an upper bound for S, then ∃x ∈ S(y < x).
Proof. Suppose that y is not an upper bound for S. Then
¬∀x ∈ S(x 6 y)
by definition 3. By definition of ¬∀, there exists x ∈ S with x 6 y. Antisym-
metry contraposed gives x 6= y, and totality shows that y 6 x. Thus y < x by
definition.
This proposition establishes unusually strong linearity on R for a system not
using disjunctive syllogism.
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3 The Field R
In this section we take some notes on the algebraic aspects of the reals, in
preparation for topological inquiries. We set
R+ = {x ∈ R : 0 6 x} \ {0}
calling attention to the definition of X \ {Y } in §2.1. This is to allow division
by x ∈ R+, about which more in §3.2.
3.1 Archimedean Properties
We suppose the order 6 on N ⊆ R to include the following properties,9 for all
n ∈ N:
(i) n+ 1 ∈ N,
(ii) n 6 n+ 1,
(iii) 0 < 1/n.
The next theorem uses these properties; it contains the germ of the idea we will
need to prove the Heine-Borel theorem.
Theorem 5. N is not bounded from above in R.
Proof. Either N is bounded above in R or it is not. If not, we are done. If there
is a real upper bound for N, then there is a least (axiom 3), k = supN, such
that
∀n ∈ N(n 6 k)
Since N is closed under addition, similarly n+ 1 6 k for all natural numbers n.
But then n 6 k− 1 for all n ∈ N, and k− 1 is also an upper bound for N. Since
k ∈ R is the least upper bound, by definition 3, k 6 k− 1. By the ordering and
field properties of R, k−1 6 k. Now by antisymmetry we have k = k−1, which
yields 0 = 1 and thus ⊥. And ⊥ implies that N is unbounded above. Therefore
in either case N the result follows.
Proposition 6. ∀x ∈ R+∃n ∈ N(0 < 1/n < x).
Proof. First note that 1/n > 0 for all n ∈ N. Now suppose
∃x ∈ R+∀n ∈ N(1/n 6< x)
9In [24, §7], the set theoretic ordinal ω and its membership/inclusion relations are shown
to be appropriate representations of the natural order on N.
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Then 1/n 6 x, and so by total order, x 6 1/n. Then n 6 1/x for all n ∈ N.
This means that 1/x is an upper bound for N, and the reasoning from theorem
5 completes the proof.
Proposition 7 (Archimedes’ Axiom). ∀x ∈ R+∃n ∈ N(x < n).
Proof. If there exists x ∈ R+ such that x 6< n for all natural numbers n, then
by definition of < and totality, we get x > n for all n ∈ N. The reasoning from
theorem 5 again completes the proof.
Corollary 8. ∀x, y ∈ R+∃n ∈ N(y < xn).
Proof. Since y/x ∈ R+, by proposition 7 we have y/x < n, for some n ∈ N.
Multiply both sides by x.
Theorem 9 (Density of R). For all x, y ∈ R with x < y, there exists z ∈ R
such that x < z < y.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that y > 0. Since y − x ∈ R, from
proposition 6, we obtain n ∈ N such that 1/n < y−x. Then x+ 1/n < y, while
x < x+ 1/n. Then x+ 1/n is the number we need.
It is convenient for later, if a bit miscellaneous, to include the following here:
Definition 4. The absolute value of any x ∈ R is given by the function10
|x| =
{
x if 0 6 x;
−x if x < 0.
Lemma 10. x 6 0 ` 0 6 −x.
Proof. By the interaction between order and field, if x 6 0 then x+−x 6 0+−x.
Since x+−x = 0 and 0 +−x = −x+ 0 = −x, substituting gives the result.
Theorem 11 (Triangle Inequality). |x+ y| 6 |x|+ |y|.
Proof. If both x, y are greater than or equal to 0, then x = |x| and y = |y|, and
|x+ y| = x+ y = |x|+ |y|, as needed. Similarly, if both x, y 6 0, then x+ y 6 0,
and so
|x+ y| = −(x+ y) = −x+ (−y) = |x|+ |y|.
Now without loss of generality suppose x > 0 and y 6 0. Then |x|+ |y| = x−y.
Since y 6 0, we have too that −y > 0. But y 6 −y allows us to deduce
10The notion of a function is grounded in the standard set theoretic definitions [24], and
associated function symbols are used liberally.
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x+ y 6 x− y by lemma 10. Similarly, since −x 6 x, −x− y 6 x− y. It follows
that
|x+ y| 6 x− y = |x|+ |y|.
as required.
3.2 Inconsistency?
This paper is motivated in part by considering inconsistency in the early calcu-
lus. It is now time to investigate the role of inconsistency here.
A fact first noticed by Dunn, and then reported in the paraconsistent analysis
literature, e.g. [17], concerns ‘dividing by zero’. For all a, we know a − a = 0.
But suppose a 6= a. Then it would appear that a − a 6= 0. (According to
theorem 12 below, a 6= a implies a < a, which further implies 0 < a − a.) If
being non-identical with 0 were all it took to have an inverse, then we also have
the existence of an 1a−a , such that
a− a
a− a = 1





a− a = 0
which is 1 = 0.
This explains our strong condition for the existence of multiplicative inverses.
The number a−a will not have an inverse, even if a 6= a. Nonetheless, even with
such precautions the real line is still not entirely safe for inconsistent numbers,
as we now show.
Theorem 12. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) x 6 x,
(ii) x < x,
(iii) x 6= x.
Proof. If (i) holds, then since x = x for all x, (ii) follows by definition. And if
(ii) holds, then again by definition x 6 x ∧ x 6= x, and therefore (iii) follows.
Last, if (iii) holds, then by antisymmetry contraposed and reduction, (i) follows.
Thus all three statements are equivalent.
Here follows the usual gloss on the strict ordering:
Lemma 13. x < y ` ∃r ∈ R (r > 0 ∧ x+ r = y) .
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Proof. Since x < y implies that 0 < y − x, and since r = y − x > 0, using
commutativity of addition and properties of the additive inverse,
x+ r = x+ (y − x) = y + (x− x) = y.
This is enough for the immediate corollary:
Corollary 14. For each x ∈ R, if x < x then 0 < 0.
Proof. If x < x then some r > 0 is such that x+ r = x (lemma 13). Canceling,
r = 0. But also r > 0, so by substitution, 0 < 0 (and, by theorem 12, 0 6= 0).
But this is just a particular instance of a more general theorem:
Theorem 15. Inconsistency at the level of order or identity spreads; that is,
∃x ∈ R x < x ` ∀x ∈ R x < x,
and equivalently for x 6= x, x 6 x, as in theorem 12.
Proof. If x < x, then x+ y < x+ y. Then −x+ (x+ y) < −x+ (x+ y), hence
(x− x) + y < (x− x) + y, hence y < y for any y. By theorem 12, the same goes
for 6= and 6 .
The algebra of fields is designed to preserve the relations = and 6 (and
derivatively, <) under the operations of addition and multiplication. We see
that such preservation is very robust here. Any inconsistency at the level of
a particular single number, say some proposed infinitesimal ε < ε, will carry
out to all the numbers x < x. There does not appear to be a way to have
inconsistent numbers in an algebraic field, if that field is to support cancellation
laws like x + z = y + z ` x = y; cf. [16, p. 43]. A fortiori any ε = 0 for which
ε 6== 0 will explode.
On the other hand, we emphasize that the existence of inconsistent numbers
x < x does not appear to follow from our axioms (all of which are rephrased
classical axioms). And while we have shown that inconsistency spreads, this
appears to be true only at the level of negated algebraic relations. That is, even
in the event of ∀x x < x, the proposed axioms do not seem to lead to ⊥. (Given
our arrangement, with key principles formalized by non-contraposable rules, why
would 0 = 1 follow from 1 6= 1?) Such a theory would not be (logically) trivial.
The theory would be very ‘noisy,’ so to speak, but there wouldn’t necessarily
be interference in deriving many commonplace results. Enough precautions are
installed that the possibility of this being (a step towards) the inconsistent but
non-trivial Newton-Leibniz calculus is not ruled out.
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4 Compactness
The purpose of this section is to prove a cornerstone of many important theorems
in real analysis: the Heine-Borel compactness theorem. In order to establish it
paraconsistently, once again we are very careful about how terms are defined,
and the way theorems are phrased, e.g. definition 3 for theorem 18. The se-
quence of arguments and strategies building up to the Heine-Borel theorem is
novel; to begin this section, we outline the ideas.
4.1 Method: Direct reasoning, finite and infinite
The Heine-Borel theorem concerns a relationship between finite and infinite
sets (via definitions 5 and 8 below). The standard argument follows a back-
and-forth halving strategy: suppose the relationship fails, argue down a nest
of intervals (definition 6 below) by choosing each time the side of the interval
for which it fails, reach a point where it holds, and thus the supposition is
‘reduced to absurdity’. That will not work here, because we cannot isolate
specific suppositions to reject. Given an argument from
A0, ..., Ak
to B, then, supposing B is a contradiction, this leaves us with only
¬A0 ∨ ... ∨ ¬Ak
and without disjunctive syllogism, the argument now stops. Unless all these
disjuncts reduce to absurdity, as opposed to merely being contradictory, there
is no way to make the logic insist on one disjunct or another. And the back-
and-forth strategy employs more than one assumption to move forward.
To solve this problem, we directly examine the structure of the line, without
making suppositions we plan to reject, and keeping careful track of the process
of inspection. To make this precise we need a metaphor for inspecting a nest
of intervals. This is where ideas from constructive analysis come in, and in
particular the concept of a finite binary tree (definition 7).
Further, we must draw heavily on the logical relationship between finite
and infinite, using the key lemma 17 below. This is a powerful generalization of
theorem 5, showing that the structure of N enforces a very sharp divide between
finite and infinite. Now, though, instead of considering extrinsic bounds on N
as they come from the least upper bound property of R, we consider intrinsic
bounds on finitude. Direct arguments are used.
14
Definition 5. Let |X| be the number of elements in a set X, its cardinality.11
Then X is finite iff
∃n ∈ N(|X| 6 n),
and X is infinite iff ∀n ∈ Nn < |X|.
Lemma 16. Any X is either finite or infinite. A fortiori, if X is not infinite,
it is finite.
Proof. We prove the stronger conditional claim, from which the first disjunctive
claim follows by structural rules. If X is not infinite, then ∃n ∈ N(n 6< |X|).
Then by total order and definitions, ∃n ∈ N(|X| 6 n ∨ |X| = n); but by
antisymmetry, |X| = n weakens to |X| 6 n; therefore ∃n ∈ N(|X| 6 n), showing
finitude.
Lemma 17. If any X is both finite and infinite, then ⊥.
Proof. Let X be both finite and infinite:
∃n ∈ N(|X| 6 n) and ∀n ∈ N(n < |X|).
Since |X| > n for all n ∈ N, also |X| > n for all n. Since |X| 6 n for some
n ∈ N, then by antisymmetry, |X| = n, for some n ∈ N. But, by infinitude
of X and the ordering on N, we have |X| > n + 1. Therefore, n > n + 1 by
substitution, so that n > n + 1 by definition. Since also n 6 n + 1 by the
ordering of the natural numbers, antisymmetry gives n = n+ 1. Subtracting n
from both sides entails 0 = 1, which is ⊥.
4.2 Nested Intervals
A sequence of real numbers is, as usual, a set of ordered pairs 〈n, xn〉, i.e. a
function from the natural numbers N to the reals R; we call xn the nth term of
the sequence. Often we denote a sequence by (xn)
∞
n=0, (xn)n>0, or simply (xn).
The basic topological concept is open set, and open subset.12
Definition 6. A subset S of R is open if
∀x ∈ S∃r ∈ R+(|x− y| < r → y ∈ S)
A subset S of R is closed iff its R \ S is open.
11Not to be confused with the notation for absolute values. For a specification of cardinality
in a paraconsistent set theory, see [4, p. 315]. No special properties of a theory of cardinal
numbers are needed here, save that such a theory exists, and that the 6 we have been studying
is the same 6 that orders the transfinite cardinals, but restricted to R.
12It is worth pointing out that the logic of open sets has been said to be naturally intuition-
istic, and that of closed sets naturally paraconsistent [16, p.103].
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A closed interval from a to b is the set [a, b] = {x : a 6 x ∧ x 6 b}. A nest
of intervals is a sequence of intervals ([an, bn])
∞
n=0 such that
[an+1, bn+1] ⊆ [an, bn]
for all n. A decreasing nest is a nest such that [an, bn] ⊂ [an+1, bn+1].
If I = [a, b] is a closed interval of real numbers, then [a, (a + b)/2] is the
closed left-half of I, and [(a+ b)/2, b] is the closed right-half of I.
Theorem 18 (Nested Intervals Theorem). The intersection of a nested se-
quence of closed intervals in R is nonempty; that is, given a nest of intervals
([an, bn])
∞
n=0, there exists x ∈ R such that x ∈ [an, bn] for all n.
Proof. Suppose ([an, bn])
∞
n=0 is a nest of intervals. Since the sequence (an) is
bounded above by any member of (bn), sup an = ξ exists; by definition 3, ξ 6 bn








Definition 7. A tree is a partially ordered set 〈T,4〉 such that for every α ∈ T ,
the set {β ∈ T : β 4 α} is linearly ordered by 4. The elements of T are called
vertices. A linearly ordered subset of T is called a branch or a path through T .
A vertex α′ ∈ T is an immediate successor of α ∈ T iff
α 4 α′ ∧ ∀β ∈ {x : α 4 x 4 α′}(β = α ∨ β = α′).
A binary tree is a tree in which every α ∈ T has at most two immediate succes-
sors α′, α′′ in the partial order.
A tree is finite if the set T is. A path p ⊆ T has length |p|, and the number
of vertices below a vertex α is |α|.
Lemma 19 (Ko¨nig’s Lemma). Let T be a binary tree. If T is infinite, then T
has an infinite path.
Proof. Let T be an infinite binary tree, and let α0 be the first (topmost) vertex
of T . We inductively construct an infinite path throught T as follows.
Let αn be a vertex. Since T is a binary tree, αn has at most two vertices
directly below it, α′ and α′′. If both |α′| and |α′′| are finite, then |αn| is also
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finite, because
|αn| 6 |α′|+ |α′′|+ 2. (1)
Now suppose αn has infinitely many vertices below it (as is certainly true of α0,
since T is infinite). By excluding the middle, either at least one of |α′|, |α′′| is
infinite, or both |α′| and |α′′| are finite. In the latter case, |αn| is both finite, by
(1), and infinite, by assumption. Then by lemma 17, at least one of |α′|, |α′′| is
infinite. Therefore there is an immediate successor with infinitely many vertices
below it.
So for each n, choose αn+1 a vertex directly below αn with infinitely many
below. Formally, define by recursion
α0 = α0
αn+1 =
α′ if |α′| is infinite,α′′ otherwise,
where α′, α′′ are the immediate successors of αn. This gives an infinite path
α0α1α2 . . . through T .
It is the classical contrapositive of Ko¨nig’s Lemma that we need. A direct
proof is again provided.
Theorem 20 (Brouwer’s Fan Theorem). Let T be a binary tree. If every path
through T is finite, then T is finite.
Proof. Either T is finite or it is infinite. Suppose T is infinite. Then, by Ko¨nig’s
Lemma, there exists an infinite path p through T . Since every path through T
is finite, |p| is finite; so |p| is both finite and infinite. By lemma 17, it follows
that T is finite. Thus, in either case, T is finite.
Brouwer’s Fan Theorem is a fundamental theorem of Brouwer’s intuitionism
(though not of all varieties of constructive mathematics, for there are recursive
counterexamples; see [5, Ch. 3]). Its use here is striking, since paraconsistent
logic can be thought of as dual to intuitionism [16, ch. 11], [7]. It is precisely the
similarity of the fan theorem—and the non-acceptability of the latter in some
forms of constructivism—to notions of compactness that blocks constructive
proofs for theorems such as Heine-Borel.
4.4 The Heine-Borel Theorem
One last preliminary observation is needed. It hints at intrinsic interest worthy
of further study, which we leave for now to future work on paraconsistent topol-
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ogy. Note that both the closed left-half and the closed right-half of a closed
interval of real numbers are closed. This follows immediately from definition 6.
Lemma 21. Any closed interval of real numbers is equal to the union of its
closed halves.
Proof. By trichotomy (proposition 2), it follows that if x is any real number in
a closed interval I, then x is either in the closed left-half or the closed right-half
of I (or both). If x is in either the closed left-half or closed right-half interval,
then since each closed half is a subset of I, x is in I. Thus I is the union of its
closed halves.
Definition 8. A collection of sets Y is a cover of X iff for every x ∈ X, there
is a Y ∈ Y such that x ∈ Y . Any Z is a subcover of X when Z ⊆ Y and Z
is a cover of X. An interval is I compact if every open cover of I contains a
finite subcover of I.
Theorem 22 (Heine-Borel). Every bounded closed interval of R is compact.
Proof. Let U be an open cover of a bounded closed interval I. Let I1 be a
closed half of I, let I2 be a closed half of I1, and so forth. By this procedure,
we construct a nested sequence of closed intervals I ⊃ I1 ⊃ I2 ⊃ . . . such that,
for each n,
|In| = 2−n|I|.





Since U is an open cover, there exists an open set U ∈ U such that ξ ∈ U . By
the definition of open set, there is some r > 0 such that |x − ξ| < r implies
x ∈ U . Now choose N ∈ N such that 2−N |I| < r. Then for each x ∈ IN ,
|x− ξ| 6 2−N |I| < r,
which implies that x ∈ U . So IN ⊆ U and hence for each n > N , In admits
a finite subcover—namely, the open set U . Thus, any sequence of closed half-
intervals eventually admits a single open cover.
Consider the collection TI of sequences formed by taking the collection of
all sequences of closed half-intervals and truncating each sequence after the first
member where it admits a single open cover.13 The result corresponds to a
13The meaning of phrases like ‘truncating after the first members such that...’ can be made
perfectly precise, as per definition 3.
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binary tree for which each path is finite. Theorem 20 now ensures that this tree
is finite.
It remains to identify a collection that is a finite subcover of the interval.
Consider the set V of all U ∈ U such that U covers the last member of some
path through TI . First, V ⊆ U . Second, for every x ∈ I, it follows from lemma
21 that x belongs to one of the In contained in some U ∈ V. Finally, since TI
is finite, V is finite, as was to be shown.
5 Conclusion
The paraconsistent approach promises to recover an essential core of classical
analysis. With a few more familiar notions on convergence, we could shed
more light on the the real line—showing the completeness of R. Further, the
Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem states that every bounded, infinite sequence in R
has a convergent subsequence; the proof of this theorem is another variation on
the nested intervals property and associated arguments (theorem 18), requiring
only an additional squeezing lemma.14 But here is not the place to do justice
to these ideas. Enough has been put forward to show that, with suitable and
intuitive background assumptions, a paraconsistent development of analysis is
not only viable, but it is rich.
What can the reader, who may be a classical mathematician, take out of
the results so far obtained? We cannot claim that the proofs are constructive;
some are not. Yet the proofs do seem to offer kinds of information that classical
arguments do not. One such feature that our arrangement makes clear is: what
can and cannot be inconsistent. For example, only two very distinctive points
of consistency-on-pain-of-absurdity (at the finite/infinite boundary (lemma 17),
and at 0 = 1) have been sufficient to derive compactness results. Meanwhile,
the possibility of a natural inconsistency arising at some other level is prepared
for, since we have used only paraconsistently valid deductions.15 These are first
steps to understanding the full, unreconstructed ideas of calculus and topology.
More expansively, and in keeping with one of the original motivations for
the particular logic used here, we suggest that the inferences in the proofs are
more relevant than what is proved using classical ex contradictione quodlibet.
If we cannot go from A∧¬A to B without some discerning reason, then incon-
sistent assumptions concerning A will not shed any light on B, whether those
assumptions are true or not. Allowing inconsistent counterexamples carves the
details of reasoning, of proof and structure, more finely than the classical or
constructive analysis. The typical classical proof can obscure content of the
14For functions f < g < h, if f and g go to the same limit, then g does, too.
15Noting again that any inconsistency has not yet been demonstrated.
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theorem by a reductio; this is well-known from the perspective of constructive
logics, but has been less appreciated in other logics. Now, bridging the gap
between non-classical mathematics, combining techniques, has begun. In doing
so, even more made visible—only without the assumption of consistency.
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6 Appendix: The Logic
The following is a Hilbert-style presentation of a relevant, paraconsistent logic.
It is a substructural weakening of the logic DKQ; see [21], [4], and the note on
Curry below. The language is that of first order logic with identity. The usual
shorthand is used: A ∨ B for ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B); A ↔ B for (A → B) ∧ (B → A); ∃
is ¬∀¬.
Axioms
All instances of the following schemata are theorems:
I A→ A
IIa A ∧B → A
IIb A ∧B → B
III A ∧ (B ∨ C)→ (A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧ C) (distribution)
IV (A→ B) ∧ (B → C)→ (A→ C) (conjunctive syllogism)
V (A→ ¬B)→ (B → ¬A) (contraposition)
V I ¬¬B → B (double negation elimination)
V II A ∨ ¬A (excluded middle)
V III (∀x)A→ A(a/x)
IX (∀x)(A→ B)→ (A→ (∀x)B)
X (∀x)(A ∨B)→ A ∨ (∀x)B
Axioms IX and X have the caveat that x does not appear free in A. Note
that the law of excluded middle implies, by definition of connectives, the law of
non-contradiction, ¬(A ∧ ¬A). This does not preclude contradictions, though;
if there are any B such that B ∧ ¬B, then the law of non-contradiction is itself
contradictory, too. Excluded middle also makes the following rule valid:
A→ B ` ¬A ∨B
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The converse fails. This shows in a precise way how our arrow is stronger than
standard material implication.
Rules
The following rules are valid:
I A,B ` A ∧B (adjunction)
II A,A→ B ` B (modus ponens)
III A ` (∀x)A (universal generalization)
IV A,¬B ` ¬(A→ B) (counterexample)
V A→ B,C → D ` (B → C)→ (A→ D) (hypothetical syllogism)
V I x = y a` A(x)↔ A(y) (substitution)
Rule V I characterizes = as an equivalence relation.
Structural rules
A ` B
A ∨ C ` B ∨ C
A ` B
∃xA ` ∃xB
A ` C B ` C
A ∨B ` C
These (called meta-rules by Meyer and the Brady) validate the argument:
if A ` B, and ¬A ` B, then A ∨ ¬A ` B.
Since excluded middle is a property of our logic, this is sufficient for B. We also
get reductio—if A ` ¬A, then ¬A. Arguments by cases of this sort are used
very extensively in our paper, beginning in §1.3 and repeating throughout.
A note on Curry’s paradox
There is a question about whether our restricted quantifiers contract, and so
give rise to Curry’s paradox. In this paper, set abstraction is used, so x ∈ {z :
A(z)} is synonymous with A(x). One can use the logic DKQ for a full blown
paraconsistent set theory, paradoxes and all [21]; Brady has provided models
showing non-triviality. In this paper though we are not concerned with sets
larger than R, nor do we do anything with sets per se, beyond very standard
mathematical bookkeeping; and so naive set theory does not in fact seem to be
required. Therefore whether or not the restricted quantifiers contract seems in
part to be a moot point, because Curry sets C = {x : x ∈ x→ ⊥} will not arise.
All the same, we want paraconsistent real analysis to be compatible with
paraconsistent set theory. And even if we didn’t, there are concerns about
validity curries [2], against which we take precaution. The logic just presented is




The above rule is not valid in general. Neither does the logic include the
operator-contracting axiom
(A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)→ (A→ B ∧ C)
(We have assumed the dual, argument by cases, in structural form.) And thus
all the ‘validity Curries’ that would afflict us in using A ` B to define ∀x ∈
A(x ∈ B), appear to be circumvented. Again, this is a response to the very
recent [2].
The loss of structural contraction is not so great as may be feared. When A is
a proven theorem, we may use A as many times as we like. Most mathematically
interesting arguments of the form A ` B involve premises that are either axioms
or theorems. Ergo the repeated use of these premises can be discharged all at
once. So in practice unwieldy, irreducible statements like A, ..., A ` B almost
never come up; none have in the various arguments above.
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